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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Thomas Donndelinger appeals from the district court's intermediate
appellate decision affirming his conviction for DUI.

Specifically, Donndelinger

challenges the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal based on the
admission of evidence of his BAC over his objection made the day of trial, an
alleged violation of the rules of discovery, and the fairness of his trial following an
alleged accumulation of errors.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A jury convicted Donndelinger of driving under the influence of alcohol.
(R., p.140.) He filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or in the alternative a new
trial, asserting his BAC results were improperly admitted as evidence against
him, the state had failed to comply with the rules of discovery as relating to its
rebuttal witness, and that a portion of a video was improperly admitted during his
trial. 1 (R., pp.148-155.)
The magistrate court conducted a hearing, denied the first and third bases
the motion from the bench, took the issue of the alleged discovery violation under
advisement, and ultimately issued a written order denying the motion in its
entirety.

(R., pp.165, 171-178.)

Donndelinger appealed the magistrate's

decision to the district court (R., p.168) and filed a brief asserting the same
issues that are before this Court (R., pp.197-208).

The district court heard

argument in the case and took the matter under advisement (R., pp.236-237),

1

Donndelinger does not challenge the introduction of the video on appeal.

1

ultimately issuing a memorandum and order affirming the judgment against
Donndelinger (R., pp.238-248).
Donndelinger timely appeals. (R., pp. 249-251.)

2

ISSUES

Donndelinger states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was the fifteen-minute observation period prior to testing
performed in conformance with the rules promulgated by the
Idaho State police and I.C. § 18-8004?

2.

Did the State's failure to comply with Appellant's discovery
requests deny him the opportunity of effective crossexamination and a fair trial?

3.

Does the accumulation of errors require the Appellant be
granted a new trial?

4.

Did the Magistrate err in denying Appellant's motion for a
Judgment of Acquittal or in the alternative a New Trial?

(Appellant's brief, p.2.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1. Has Donndelinger failed to show the magistrate court erred in finding the
proper foundation had been laid for the admission at trial of his BAC result?
2. Has Donndelinger failed to establish that the magistrate court abused its
discretion in declining to exclude the testimony of the state's rebuttal witness as a
sanction for an alleged discovery violation?
3. Has Donndelinger failed to show error, much less cumulative error?
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ARGUMENTS
I.
Donndelinger Has Failed To Show That The Magistrate Court Erred In Allowing
The Introduction Of His BAC Results At Trial
A.

Introduction
Donndelinger argues the magistrate "erred in finding proper foundation

had been laid and allowing the breath test results to be presented to the jury over
[his] objection." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) Donndelinger's argument fails because
the record shows proper foundation for admission of the evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."

kl

"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s]
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure."

kl

(citing Losser, 145

Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137
(1981)).
In a DUI prosecution, whether the state has satisfied the foundational
requirements for the admission of breath test results is a question of law over
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which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451,
452, 988 P.2d 225, 226 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Remsburg. 126 Idaho 338, 339,
882 P.2d 993, 994 (Ct. App. 1994).

C.

The Breath Alcohol Testing Complied With The Requirement Of A 15
Minute Monitoring Period
The standard operating procedures state that a suspect "should be

monitored for at least fifteen (15) minutes" prior to breath testing. SOP 6.1.
During this period the suspect "should not be allowed to smoke, drink, eat, or
belch/burp/vomit/regurgitate." Id.

"During the monitoring period, the Operator

must be alert for any event that might influence the accuracy of the breath
alcohol test." SOP 6.1.4. Such events include "the presence of mouth alcohol,"
SOP 6.1.4.1, and vomiting or regurgitating "material from the stomach into the
[suspect's] breath pathway," SOP 6.1.4.1.
The purpose of monitoring for 15 minutes prior to breath testing is "to rule
out the possibility that alcohol or other substances have been introduced into the
subject's mouth from the outside or by belching or regurgitation."

Bennett v.

State, Dept. of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 144, 206 P.3d 505, 508 (Ct. App. 2009).
The "level of surveillance must be such as could reasonably be expected to
accomplish that purpose." Wilkinson v. State, Dept. of Transp., 151 Idaho 784,
787, 264 P.3d 680, 683 (Ct. App. 2011) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). This is not an "onerous burden" and "ordinarily will be met if the officer
stays in close physical proximity to the test subject so that the officer's senses of
sight, smell and hearing can be employed." Wilkinson, 151 Idaho at 787-88, 264
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P.3d at 683-84 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Bennett, 147 Idaho at 144,
206 P.3d at 508).
At Donndelinger's trial, Trooper Murakami testified about the 15 minute
observation period she conducted prior to obtaining a breath alcohol sample from
Donndelinger.

(See generally Tr., p.98, L.12 -

p.105, L.25.)

Although

Donndelinger objected to a lack of foundation in the admission of his BAC
because he asserted there was "no assurance" the trooper in this case
adequately observed Donndelinger to "ensure that [he did] not burp or belch or
otherwise regurgitate anything from his stomach" (Tr., p.107, L.21 - p.108, L.2),
the magistrate court found there was sufficient foundation based upon Trooper
Murakami's testimony that she "could hear and see" Donndelinger "throughout
the observation period (Tr., p.109, L.24- p.111, L.4). The district court affirmed
the magistrate's ruling, finding it "obviously credited [Trooper Murakami's]
testimony" that "she could see and hear Donndelinger during the observation
period." (R., p.241, n.8.)
Donndelinger asserts on appeal that the trooper's "senses of sounds and
smell were defeated by the conditions existing both inside and outside of the
vehicle," specifically when she looked away from Donndelinger "to attend to
paperwork, prepare the Lifeloc for testing, and open her car door to find a pen."
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) This assertion is contrary to the testimony of Trooper
Murakami that she could see and hear Donndelinger. In fact, her interaction with
him was such that she was aware of his increasing anxiety and tried to assist him
in "calm[ing] down." (Tr., p.98, L.21 - p.99, L.9.)
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The magistrate and the district court applied the correct legal standards to
the facts and concluded that the officer complied with the 15 minute monitoring
period required by the standard operating procedures. Donndelinger has failed
to show error.

11.
Donndelinger Has Failed To Establish That The Magistrate Court Abused Its
Discretion In Declining To Exclude The Testimony Of The State's Rebuttal
Witness As A Sanction For An Alleged Discovery Violation
A.

Introduction
Donndelinger argues that the magistrate court abused its discretion in

declining to exclude the testimony of one of the state's witnesses for whom the
state "fail[ed] to disclose requested expert witness testimony." (Appellant's brief,
pp.4-6.) Donndelinger's argument fails for two reasons. First, Donndelinger's
claim of a discovery violation is without merit because a review of the record and
the applicable law shows that the witness at issue was a rebuttal witness whom
the state was not required to disclose. Second, even if the state did have an
obligation to disclose the witness, the record supports the magistrate court's
determination that Donndelinger was not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of
disclosure and, as such, exclusion of the witnesses' testimony was neither
warranted nor required.

Donndelinger has failed to establish an abuse of

discretion.
B.

Standard of Review
"Whether to impose a sanction for a discovery violation, and the choice of

an appropriate sanction, are within the discretion of the trial court."
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State v.

Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 586, 199 P.3d 155, 161 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State
v. Allen, 145 Idaho 183, 185, 177 P.3d 397, 399 (Ct. App. 2008)). See also State
v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 104, 175 P.3d 788, 793 (2008). "[T]he trial court's
exercise of that discretion is beyond the purview of a reviewing court unless it
has been clearly abused." State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 208, 899 P.2d 416,
421 (1995) (citing State v. Buss, 98 Idaho 173,174,560 P.2d 495,496 (1977)).

C.

Relevant Facts And Procedure
The magistrate court made the following unchallenged findings with

respect to the procedural history leading up to Donndelinger's motion to exclude
the state's witness:
The third motion concerns' the state's expert witness, Jeremy
Mr. Johnston is employed by Idaho State Police
Johnston.
Forensic Services.
Mr. Johnston did not testify during the state's case-in-chief. Once
the defense expert witnesses testified, Mr. Johnson served as a
rebuttal witness. He specifically addressed issues raised by the
defense's expert witnesses.
Defendant contends that the state committed discovery violations
by failing to disclose the expected substance of Jeremy Johnston's
testimony.
The issue developed, as follows:
•
The original citation in this case was filed in December,
2009.
•
On August 23, 2010, the court heard the Defendant's motion
in /imine, concerning the admissibility of the Lifeloc FC20 results.
Defendant is also an expert witness, based on his occupation as a
physician, and he testified about certain experiments he had
conducted on foods, using the Lifeloc FC20 device.
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•
Both parties filed numerous discovery requests and
responses throughout the case.
On November 19, 2012,
Defendant filed a specific request for: "Expert testimony of Jeremy
Johnston or any other expert called by the state."
•
On December 10, 2010, Defendant filed his "Eighth
Supplemental Response Request for Discovery."
With that
response, he included an 11-page summary of tests concluded by
Dr. John Kalivas. Dr. Kalivas, who eventually testified at the trial,
conducted experiments on Cyclosporine, black pepper and
rosemary, using the Lifeloc FC20.
•
The state did not file any further discovery response
concerning Jeremy Johnston's expected testimony, nor did the
defense file a motion to compel discovery.
•
The trial was held on December 21-22, 2010. Jeremy
Johnston did not testify in the state's case-in-chief. Dr. Kalivas and
Defendant both testified as experts in the defense case.
•
Jeremy Johnston was then called as a rebuttal witness by
the state.

•
The defense then proceeded to cross-examine Mr.
Johnston, probing several of his opinions. After Mr. Johnston
described the lab experiments that he performed to allow him to
rebut the testimony of Dr. Kalivas and Defendant, defense counsel
asked him why he had not provided the results of his experiments
to the defense. AT that point the state objected, arguing that the
answer was irrelevant, and that because Mr. Johnston was a
rebuttal witness he and the state were under no obligation to
disclose the results of his test. Out of the presence of the jury, the
defense argued that the jury should be allowed to know that the
defense had not had time to anticipate Mr. Johnston's testimony.
The court eventually overruled the state's objection and allowed
defense counsel to ask Mr. Johnston whether he had disclosed his
test results to the defense, which he had not.
•
Mr. Johnston's testimony was thereafter completed, without
further objection on this subject.
(R., pp.173-175.)
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D.

Donndelinger Has Failed To Establish The Magistrate Court Abused Its
Discretion In Allowing The Testimony Of The State's Rebuttal Witness
Following his conviction by a jury, Donndelinger moved for a judgment of

acquittal or in the alternative a new trial, arguing in part that the "State gained an
unfair advantage by characterizing their expert witness as a rebuttal witness and
not complying with the rules of discovery." (R., p.151.) The magistrate court
noted Donndelinger's claim that the state failed to comply with discovery was
raised for the first time after the trial. (R., p.175.) "Generally Idaho's appellate
courts will not consider error not preserved for appeal through an objection at
trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 244, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citing State
v. Johnson, 136 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d 125, 129 (1995)).
Idaho Criminal Rule 16 governs discovery in criminal cases. Pursuant to
I.C.R. 16(a), a prosecutor is required to disclose to the defense all exculpatory
evidence within the prosecutor's possession or control. I.C.R. 16(a); see also
State v. Lopez, 107 Idaho 726, 739, 692 P.2d 370, 383 (Ct. App. 1984) (citation
omitted) (prosecutor is also constitutionally required to disclose exculpatory
evidence); State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96,106,685 P.2d 837, 847 (Ct. App. 1984)
(citation omitted) ("[T]he constitutional duty of disclosure and the requirement to
disclose under Rule 16(a) both relate to exculpatory evidence."). A prosecutor is
also "required by rule to disclose, upon request, the names and addresses of
persons having knowledge of the relevant facts." Lopez, 107 Idaho at 739, 692
P.2d at 383 (citing I.C.R. 16(b)(6)).

It is well settled, however, that a

"prosecutor's duty to disclose witnesses does not extend to persons called for
rebuttal."

kl

(citing Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 685 P.2d 837); see also State v.
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Karpach, 146 Idaho 736, 739 n.2, 202 P.3d 1282, 1285 n.2 (Ct. App. 2009)
(noting "general rule that rebuttal witnesses need not be disclosed"); State v.
Matthews, 108 Idaho 482, 486, 700 P.2d 104, 108 (Ct. App. 1985) (citation
omitted) ("There is no constitutional duty for the state to disclose potentially
inculpatory testimony of a rebuttal witness.").
The magistrate found that although Donndelinger made a proper request
for discovery, "Jeremy Johnston was truly a rebuttal witness and was called to
rebut defense theories that had plainly been disclosed to the state." (R., p.176.)
Further, Donndelinger "did not make a motion seeking court intervention in the
nondisclosure."

(Id.)

As the magistrate noted, had Donndelinger raised a

discovery issue at an appropriate time, "a variety of avenues would have been
available to the court." (R., p.176.) But because Donndelinger did not raise the
issue prior to trial, it was "impossible to know what sanction, if any, would have
been applied to the discovery violation, if established." (R., p.177.) See State v.
Caswell, 121 Idaho 801, 804, 828 P.2d 830, 833 (1992) (defendant "cannot wait
to raise the issue of the inadequacy of the State's response by merely objecting
at trial when the State's witness is called to testify.")
The magistrate further found that Mr. Johnston's testimony "did not
introduce any substantially new issues into the trial," thereby finding no prejudice
to Donndelinger requiring the "ultimate sanction of vacating the verdict."

(R.,

p.177.) State v. Matthews, 124 Idaho 806, 864 P.2d 644 (Ct. App. 1993) ("The
choice of an appropriate sanction for failure to comply with a discovery request is
within the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's exercise of that
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discretion is beyond the purview of a reviewing court unless it has been clearly
abused.")
Because Donndelinger had the opportunity but failed to address the
alleged discovery violation through the appropriate venue, he was precluded
from waiting until trial to raise the inadequacy of the state's discovery responses.
Additionally, because there has been no showing of prejudice to Donndelinger by
the introduction of Mr. Johnston's rebuttal testimony at trial, Donndelinger has
failed to establish the magistrate court abused its discretion by allowing the
same.

111.
Donndelinger Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Cumulative Error
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.

State v.

Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Donndelinger
has failed to show any error2 , much less two or more errors. Thus, the doctrine
of cumulative error does not apply in this case. See, M-, LaBelle v. State, 130
Idaho 115,121,937 P.2d 427,433 (Ct. App.1997).

Donndelinger also attempts to use these same "errors" alleged as the basis for
his position that the magistrate court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.) I.C. § 19-2406 recognizes
the error of a trial court relating to any question of law as a ground for the
granting of a new trial. Although Donndelinger asserts the introduction of his
BAC at trial and the unobjected-to alleged discovery violation fall within this
category, the record does not support this claim. As discussed above in Sections
I, 11, and Ill above, Donndelinger has failed to establish any error by the
magistrate court at trial.
2
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Donndelinger's verdict
of guilty to DUI.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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two true and correct copies of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by
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